97 ideas
| 2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
| 20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
| 2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
| 2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
| 2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
| 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
| 20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
| 2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
| 13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
| 13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
| 2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
| 2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
| 5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
| 5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
| 5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
| 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
| 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
| 2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
| 2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
| 20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
| 2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
| 5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
| 5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
| 2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
| 2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
| 2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
| 2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
| 2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
| 2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
| 20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
| 2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
| 2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
| 2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
| 2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
| 2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
| 2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
| 2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
| 2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
| 2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
| 2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
| 2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
| 4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
| 6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
| 24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
| 2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
| 13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
| 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
| 20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
| 20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
| 2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
| 24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
| 24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
| 2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
| 2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
| 2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
| 2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
| 2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
| 2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
| 20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
| 24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
| 20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
| 4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
| 2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
| 24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
| 20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
| 24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
| 2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
| 6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |